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Abstract
In this paper we study variations of the standard Hotelling-Downs
model of spatial competition, where each agent attracts the clients in a
restricted neighborhood, each client randomly picks one attractive agent
for service.
Two utility functions for agents are considered: support utility and
winner utility. We generalize the results by Feldman et al. to the case
where the clients are distributed arbitrarily. In the support utility setting,
we show that a pure Nash equilibrium always exists by formulating the
game as a potential game. In the winner utility setting, we show that
there exists a Nash equilibrium in two cases: when there are at most 3
agents and when the size of attraction area is at least half of the entire
space. We also consider the price of anarchy and the fairness of equilibria
and give tight bounds on these criteria.
1 Introduction
Ever since the seminal works by Hotellings [11] and Downs [5], the Hotelling-
Downs model has been applied to many problems, ranging from determining
the standpoint of a election candidate to choosing locations for commercial
facilities [13, 2, 20]. In the model, two firms choose shop locations in a line
market. Customers are distributed along the line. Assume the products of
the firms are uniform, the customers always go to the closer shop. Hence, one
firm can always attract more customers by moving towards the competitor’s
location. Therefore, both firms choose the median point in the unique stable
equilibrium, attracting an equal number of customers. This also sheds light
upon the phenomenon that the candidates’ standpoints in a political election
are often close.
In political election scenarios, the assumption is taken to model the stand-
points of the candidates in [19, 6] that every candidate has an ideal location in
mind and cares about how close the winner’s location is to the ideal location.
Models with runoff voting are studied in [15, 3, 21], where the voting takes place
in multiple rounds and only a subset of candidates from the previous round enter
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the next round. In commercial facility location problems, more complex mod-
els are proposed to address other issues. For example, when making decisions,
customers consider the transportation cost caused by getting service. Such com-
petition that involves both location and pricing are considered by Hotelling’s
original model [11], and some other existing works [4, 18, 22, 14, 8].
In this paper, we focus on the pure location game [1]. It sacrifices non-
existence of Nash equilibrium in the original pure location game. Eaton et al. [7]
first show there is no Nash equilibrium when there are 3 agents in the one-
dimensional space. Shaked et al. [16] extend the non-existence to two-dimensional
space. Thereafter Osborne et al. [12] show the Nash equilibrium does not exist
in a wide range of settings when there are more than 2 agents. However, a
mixed Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist [4, 17]. This result is not obvious
considering that the utility functions in these games are not continuous with
the action. Generally, a mixed Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist in
such games.
The original Hotelling-Downs model suffers from some problematic assump-
tions: customers always choose the nearest shop without considering the dis-
tance, contradicting to the fact that a shop is no more attractive to a customer if
it is too far away. Furthermore, customers choose the shop without considering
competing shops, while in daily life, it is hard to say which shop attracts more
customers if two shops are close enough with similar products. These issues are
also discussed in [9].
To address the above issues, we consider the Hotelling-Downs model with
limited attraction, proposed in [9]. In this model, all firms (called agents here-
after) only attract customers (called clients hereafter) in a limited distance, and
if a client is attracted by multiple agents, the client picks one from those agents
with equal chance.
We analyze the Nash equilibria with two utility functions for agents: support
utility and winner utility(i.e., winner takes all setting in [9]). In the support
utility setting, agents focus on maximizing the number of its clients, modeling
the commercial competitions. While in winner utility setting, the winner in the
competition takes all the utility, which is typical for the political voting.
We extend the results on uniform distribution in [9] to arbitrary distribu-
tions. First of all, we consider the existence of pure Nash equilibrium. In support
utility setting, when the distribution is uniform and agents have the same at-
tracting distance(called width hereafter), the existence of Nash equilibra can
shown by simply constructing one. However, the method does not work any
more under other distribution. We solve this problem by formulating it as a po-
tential game. In winner utility maximization setting, to our knowledge, there is
no tool to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria in games with such utility
functions. However, we show that a pure Nash equilibrium does exist in some
simple cases.
Secondly, we study fairness and price of anarchy of Nash equilibria in support
utility setting (both of which are straightforward in the winner utility setting).
We give tight bounds on both criteria.
2
1.1 Results and contributions
• In the support utility maximization setting, support utility is continu-
ous. Applying Glicksberg’s theorem [10], continuous game guarantees a
mixed Nash equilibrium. If we let the agents dynamically best respond
to the other’s locations (one agent each round), then the location profile
converges to a Nash equilibrium. Scrutinizing each agent’s action, each
improvement actually increases a potential function. Thus the game ad-
mits a pure Nash equilibrium.
• In the winner utility maximization setting, the winner utility is not con-
tinuous any more. The game is somehow harder to analyze. We restrict
the problem to the case when the agents have the same width. We prove
that when there are at most 3 agents, there exists a pure Nash equilib-
rium. Three-agents case is very special in other variants [7, 16, 17]. The
existence of Nash equilibrium complements their results. If the agent’s
width is at least half of the client space, then there also exists a Nash
equilibrium for any number of agents.
• We study fairness and price of anarchy of Nash equilibria in support utility
setting (both of which are straightforward in the winner utility setting).
We show that the fairness criterion can be bounded by 12dwM/wme , where
wM = max{w} and wm = min{w}. We also prove that the price of
anarchy at least 12 . Both bounds are tight.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In Section 2 , we describe the coined
Hotelling-Downs model with limited attraction in [9]. In Section 3, we prove
the existence of the Nash equilibrium in support-utility maximization setting.
In Section 4, we construct a Nash equilibrium in winner utility maximization
setting. In Section 5, the support utilities in Nash equilibrium are compared.
In Section 6, the price of anarchy is given and we give an upper bound on the
amount of clients have not been served.
2 Hotelling-Downs model with limited attrac-
tion
We consider a one-dimensional location space, represented by interval [0, 1]. A
continuum of clients are distributed in the interval according to some density
function f(x). Let N = (1, 2, . . . , n) denote a finite set of agents and each agent
i is associated with an attraction width wi. Each agent chooses a location in
[0, 1] and an attraction interval Ri centered at the chosen location is formed.
The agent thus obtain the support from the clients in his attraction interval. If
a client is covered by multiple agents, the client simply randomly choose one, i.e.
the support of this client is equally divided among these agents in expectation.
Assume that agent i chooses location xi then the attraction interval Ri would
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be [xi − wi2 , xi + wi2 ]. We assume that f(x) = 0 outside the interval [0, 1] and
thus each agent will only choose a location from
[
wi
2 , 1− wi2
]
Let ~x denote the joint location profile (x1, x2, ..., xn), and ~x−i denote the
profile without i, i.e. (x1, ..., xi−1, xi+1..., xn). Given ~x, let congestion function
c(x, ~x) be the the number of attraction intervals covering point x,
c(x, ~x) = #{xi|x ∈ Ri}
Clearly, the following equation holds:
c(x, ~x) =
{
c(x, ~x−i) x /∈
[
xi − wi2 , xi + wi2
]
c(x, ~x−i) + 1 x ∈
[
xi − wi2 , xi + wi2
]
For simplicity, we use c(x) instead of c(x, ~x) when there is no ambiguity.
If a point x is covered by multiple attraction intervals (i.e., c(x) ≥ 2), then
the support of that point is evenly divided among all these agents. Agent i’s
support si is then defined to be the total support from his attraction interval:
si(~x) =
∫ xi+wi/2
xi−wi/2
f(x)
c(x)
dx
In our model, we assume that the distribution function f(x) and the width
wi,∀i are publicly known. We consider two kinds of utility settings: support
utility and winner utility. The support utility setting uses the support function
as agents’ utility function. In the winner utility setting, only agents with the
largest support are considered to be the winners, and share a total utility of 1
equally among them, while other agents have utility 0. Note that in the winner
utility setting, each agent only cares about whether he is a winner and the
number of winners, since if the agent is a winner, he has a higher utility when
there are less winners.
Formally, an attraction game is defined as follows:
Definition 1. Given the clients’ distribution f(x), an attraction game is a tuple
G = (N,w,L, u), where:
• N = (1, 2, . . . , n) is the set of all agents;
• w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) is the widths associated to agents;
• L = L1 × L2 × · · · × Ln is the set of all possible location profiles, where
Li =
[
wi
2 , 1− wi2
]
.
• u = (u1, u2, . . . , un) is the utility functions for the agents, the definition
of which depends on the setting we consider:
– in the support utility setting, ui(~x) = si(~x);
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– in the winner utility setting,
ui(~x) =
{
1
|W | i ∈W
0 otherwise
where W denotes the winner set.
A Nash equilibrium of game G is a stable location profile, where no agent
can deviate to another location to get a higher utility.
Definition 2 (Nash equilibrium). Given a game G, the set of Nash equilibra
NE(G) contains all location profiles ~x, such that ∀i ∈ N and ∀x′i ∈ Li,
ui(xi, ~x−i) ≥ ui(x′i, ~x−i)
In different utility settings, the definitions of the utility functions are differ-
ent, and thus have distinct Nash equilibria. Consider the following example:
Example. Assume that the clients are distributed uniformly. There are
3 agents with widths w1 = 0.4, w2 = 0.3, w1 = 0.4. The location profile is
~x = (0.2, 0.65, 0.8) (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: example
The corresponding congestion function is
c(x) =

1 x ∈ [0, 0.4]
0 x ∈ (0.4, 0.5]
1 x ∈ (0.5, 0.6]
2 x ∈ (0.6, 0.8]
1 x ∈ (0.8, 1]
The support of the 3 agents are
• s1 =
∫ 0.4
0
f(x) dx = 0.4
• s2 =
∫ 0.6
0.5
f(x) dx+
∫ 0.8
0.6
f(x)
2 dx = 0.2
• s3 =
∫ 0.8
0.6
f(x)
2 dx+
∫ 1
0.8
f(x) dx = 0.3
In the support utility setting, the profile ~x does not form a Nash equilibrium,
since given ~x−2, agent 2 has incentive to deviate to 0.55. And by doing so, u2
increases as R2 has less intersection with R3. However, in the winner utility
setting, the profile ~x forms a Nash equilibrium and agent 1 is the unique winner.
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3 Existence of Nash equilibrium in support util-
ity setting
A well known theorem of Glicksberg[10] states that every continuous game has
a mixed Nash equilibrium. By definition,
ui(xi, ~x−i) =
∫ xi+wi/2
xi−wi/2
f(x)
c(x, ~x−i) + 1
dx
Agent i’s support utility is continuous with xi. According to Glicksberg’s the-
orem, there exists a mixed Nash equilibrium in this setting.
However, due to the special structure of our model, we could further show
that a pure Nash equilibrium always exists. The game can be viewed as a con-
gestion game where the resources are the densities associated to each point. It is
known that every finite congestion game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Although agents’s action space is infinitely in the game, we can still show that
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
Theorem 1. There exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the support utility setting.
Proof. Given other agents’ locations ~x−i, agent i’s support utility can be written
as
ui(xi) =
∫ xi+wi2
xi−wi2
f(x)
c(x, ~x−i) + 1
dx
If agent i prefers x′i to xi, we have∫ x′i+wi2
x′i−
wi
2
f(x)
c(x, ~x−i) + 1
dx >
∫ xi+wi2
xi−wi2
f(x)
c(x, ~x−i) + 1
dx
On both sides of the inequality, we add the following term∫ 1
0
c(x,~x−i)∑
k=1
f(x)
k
dx
The left side of inequality becomes∫ 1
0
c(x,~x−i)∑
k=1
dx+
∫ x′i+wi2
x′i−
wi
2
f(x)
c(x, ~x−i) + 1
dx
=
∫ xi−wi2
0
c(x,~x−i)∑
k=1
f(x)
k
dx+
∫ 1
xi+
wi
2
c(x,~x−i)∑
k=1
f(x)
k
dx
+
∫ x′i+wi2
x′i−
wi
2
c(x,(x′i,~x−i))∑
k=1
f(x)
k
dx
=
∫ 1
0
c(x,(x′i,~x−i))∑
k=1
f(x)
k
dx.
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Similarly, we can get the right side and the inequality becomes
∫ 1
0
c(x,(x′i,~x−i))∑
k=1
f(x)
k
dx >
∫ 1
0
c(x,~x)∑
k=1
f(x)
k
dx (1)
If we start from an arbitrary location profile, many agents’ strategies are not
optimal. Then in each round, we let one agent to better respond to other agents’
strategies. By equation (1), each time one agent improves his support utility,
he actually improves a potential function,
Φ(~x) =
∫ 1
0
c(x,~x)∑
k=1
f(x)
k
dx
The potential function can be upper bounded,
Φ(~x) =
∫ 1
0
c(x,~x)∑
k=1
f(x)
k
dx ≤
∫ 1
0
n∑
k=1
f(x)
k
dx =
n∑
k=1
1
k
.
Combined the fact Φ(~x) is continuous with ~x, we have that Φ(~x) has a maximum
value. In the location profile ~x∗ = arg max~x Φ(~x), no agent can improve his
support utility and thus it is a Nash equilibrium.
Noticing that the above proof does not use the fact of one-dimension space,
and the result can be extended to multi-dimensional space.
Corollary 1. There is a pure Nash equilibrium in the support utility maximiza-
tion setting if the location space is multi-dimensional.
4 existence of nash equilibrium in winner utility
setting
In winner utility setting, the utility of agent i is no longer continuous with
respect to the agent’s location. The potential function in the support-utility-
maximizing setting does not work.
Definition 3. A game is an ordinal potential game, if there is a function φ :
A→ R such that ∀a−i ∈ A−i, ∀a′i, a′′i ∈ Ai,
(a′i, a−i)− ui(a′′i , a−i) > 0⇔ Φ(a′i, a−i)− Φ(a′′i , a−i) > 0
It seems difficult to design a potential function to prove NE existence, the
reason is the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Winner utility maximization game is not an ordinal potential
game.
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We prove by contradiction.
Proof. Consider the distribution function is
f(x) =

4/3 x ∈ [0, 1/3)
1/3 x ∈ [1/3, 2/3)
4/3 x ∈ [2/3, 1]
There are three agents with same width w = 1/3. We give two different paths
from the location profile (1/6,1/6,1/6) to (1/6,1/6,5/6).
Path 1: (1/6, 1/6, 1/6)→ (1/6, 1/6, 5/9)→ (1/6, 5/9, 5/9)→ (1/6, 5/9, 5/6)→
(1/6, 1/6, 5/6)
Path 2: (1/6, 1/6, 1/6)→ (1/6, 1/6, 5/6).
Suppose there exists a potential function Φ. In Path 1, u3 decreases in the
first step, u2 decreases in the second step. The support utility of the deviating
agent does not change in the following steps. By definition of Φ, we should have
Φ(1/6, 1/6, 5/6) < Φ(1/6, 1/6, 1/6).
In Path 2, u3 increases in the first step. By definition, we should have
Φ(1/6, 1/6, 5/6) > Φ(1/6, 1/6, 1/6), contradiction.
In this setting, there exists a new strategy that an agent increase winner
utility by decreasing the support utility of both winner and himself. Consider
the following example.
Example. Let the distribution f(x) be
f(x) =
{
5/4 x ∈ [0, 0.4]
5/6 x ∈ (0.4, 1]
Figure 2: example
There are two agents, and the location profile is ~x = (0.2, 0.8). The width
are equal w1 = w2 = 0.4. In this case, agent 1 is the winner and u1 = 0.5,
u2 = 10/3. However, agent 2 can move to x1 and share the support from [0, 0.4]
with agent 1. These two agents’ support utility become 0.25 and both agents
are winners. Notice that agent 2 becomes a winner by decreasing both agents’
support utility.
When we consider winner utility maximization setting, we restrict to the
case all agents have the same width wi = w. First we prove a lemma which
will be used frequently. This lemma roughly gives a situation where two agents
have no incentive to deviate.
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Lemma 1. Fix k ≥ 0 agents’ locations ~x at first1. Let X be the set of maxi-
mizers of ∫ x+w2
x−w2
f(y)
c(y, ~x) + 1
dy
Suppose there are two new agents A and B. If both two agents choose the two
locations xA, xB ∈ X(xA and xB could be the same) simultaneously, then both
agents have the same support utility, and both A and B cannot have more support
utility than the other by changing location.
Proof. By definition of xA and xB , we have∫ xA+w2
xA−w2
f(x)
c(x) + 1
dx =
∫ xB+w2
xB−w2
f(x)
c(x) + 1
dx
When A and B are located at the same time, their attraction interval may
overlap. This will decrease the support from clients in the intersection interval,
but the decrements in two support utility are the same. We use RA denote the
attraction interval [xA− w2 , xA+ w2 ] and RB denote the interval [xB− w2 , xB+ w2 ].
Formally, agent A’s support utility will be∫
RA−RB
f(x)
c(x) + 1
dx+
∫
RA∩RB
f(x)
c(x) + 2
dx
=
∫
RA
f(x)
c(x) + 1
dx−
∫
RA∩RB
f(x)(
1
c(x) + 2
− 1
c(x) + 1
) dx
=
∫
RB
f(x)
c(x) + 1
dx−
∫
RA∩RB
f(x)(
1
c(x) + 2
− 1
c(x) + 1
) dx
=
∫
RB−RA
f(x)
c(x) + 1
dx+
∫
RA∩RB
f(x)
c(x) + 2
dx.
which is same as agent B’s support utility.
For the second part, we prove by contradiction. Suppose A moves to xA′
and gets more support utility than B, then
∫
RA′−RB
f(x)
c(x) + 1
dx+
∫
RA′∩RB
f(x)
c(x) + 2
dx >∫
RB−RA′
f(x)
c(x) + 1
dx+
∫
RA′∩RB
f(x)
c(x) + 2
dx
⇒
∫
RA′−RB
f(x)
c(x) + 1
dx+
∫
RA′∩RB
f(x)
c(x) + 1
dx >∫
RB−RA′
f(x)
c(x) + 1
dx+
∫
RA′∩RB
f(x)
c(x) + 1
dx
⇒
∫
RA′
f(x)
c(x) + 1
dx >
∫
RB
f(x)
c(x) + 1
dx
1does not need to be a Nash equilibrium.
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which contradicts to the fact that xB is a best location. Since A and B are
symmetric, agent B cannot get more support utility than A neither.
When there are 2 agents, we put both agents at the same position where
maximizes
∫
[x−w/2,x+w/2] f(y) dy. By setting k = 0 in Lemma 1, we know both
agents are winners. Either one cannot become the unique winner by deviating.
Thus the location profile constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3. There is a pure Nash equilibrium when there are 2 agents.
When there are 3 agents, the problem becomes quite complicated. Since
there is no symmetric property, there are many cases to consider when we are
checking the stable equilibrium. We propose Algorithm 1 for 3 agents.
• Let u1 denote the largest support utility that the first player could achieve,
i.e. u1 is the maximum value of
∫ x+w/2
x−w/2 f(y) dy.
• Case 1: If we can allocate three agents at the same time such that every-
one achieves the support utility u1, then we allocate them at those three
locations.
• Case 2: If we can allocate only two agents at the same time such that
every one achieves the support utility u1, then we allocate agent 1 at one
of the two locations, the other two agents together at the other location.
• Otherwise, we can allocate only one agent that achieves the support utility
u1. There exists a set of locations that agent 1 achieves the support utility
u1, we allocate agent 1 at the leftmost one, denoted by x1. Given agent
1’s location, let the largest support utility for agent 2 is u2.
– Case 3: If agent 2 can achieve support utility u2 at location x1, we
allocate agents 2 and 3 together at x1.
– Case 4: Otherwise, if on both left side and right side of agent 1,
there exists locations where agent 2 achieves support utility u2. We
allocate agent 2 at the rightmost position in the left part and agent
3 at the leftmost position in the right part, i.e.,
x2 = max
x<x1
{
x
∣∣∣∣ ∫ x+w2
x−w2
f(y)
c(y) + 1
dy = u2
}
,
x3 = min
x>x1
{
x
∣∣∣∣ ∫ x+w2
x−w2
f(y)
c(y) + 1
dy = u2
}
.
– Case 5: Otherwise, the locations that maximize agent 2’s support
utility lie on the same side of agent 1. We allocate agent 2 to the
closest position and agent 3 at the farthest position. Let
t2 = min
{
x
∣∣∣∣ ∫ x+w2
x−w2
f(y)
c(y) + 1
dy = u2
}
,
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t3 = max
{
x
∣∣∣∣ ∫ x+w2
x−w2
f(y)
c(y) + 1
dy = u2
}
.
If t2 < x1, then set x2 = t3, x3 = t2. Otherwise, set x2 = t2, x3 = t3.
Theorem 4. When there are 3 agents, Algorithm 1 gives a pure Nash equilib-
rium.
Here is the idea of Algorithm 1. In most of time we allocate agent 1 where
he gets the largest support utility. Then we allocate agent 2 and 3 to get the
largest support utility as possible. Agent 2 and 3 have the same support utility
and hinder each other. If agent 2 wants to get the same support utility as agent
1 by decreasing both u1 and u2, then u3 becomes the largest, and agent 3 is the
unique winner. Thus the location profile forms a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof follows algorithm’s structure. In each case, we consider who
wins and whether the agents’ attraction intervals intersect. In all cases, we
prove no one has incentive to deviate.
In Case 1, winner set is {1, 2, 3}. Keeping agent 2’s location fixed, by
Lemma 1, agent 1 cannot get more support utility than agent 3.
Thus if agent 1 moves, the other two agents have at least the same support
utility. Using similar arguments, no one gets more support utility than any
other player. So on one has incentive to deviate.
In Case 2, winner set is {1}. Since agent 2 and 3 are at the same location,
we only need to prove agent 2 does not have incentive to deviate. We prove by
contradiction. Let agent 2 could become a winner by deviating to x′2. Let R
′
2
denote the corresponding attraction interval. If R′2 does not intersect with R1,
agent 1 always has more support utility than agent 2. Then R′2 intersects with
R1. For same reason, R
′
2 intersects with R3. Without agent 3, agent 2 has at
most the same support utility as agent 1. But R3 only has intersection with R
′
2,
this intersection makes agent 2 have strictly less support utility than the agent
1. So agent 2 cannot become a winner and nobody has incentive to deviate.
In Case 3, winner set is {1, 2, 3}. Since they have the same location, we only
need to prove agent 3 has no incentive to deviate. Suppose agent 3 has incentive
to deviate to x′3 with attraction interval R
′
3, then he must become the unique
winner. Formally,
∫
R′3∩R1
f(x)
3
dx+
∫
R′3−R1
f(x) dx ≥
∫
R′3∩R1
f(x)
3
dx+
∫
R1−R3
f(x)
2
dx
⇒
∫
R′3∩R1
f(x)
2
dx+
∫
R′3−R1
f(x) dx ≥
∫
R′3∩R1
f(x)
2
dx+
∫
R1−R3
f(x)
2
dx
Consider the situation when only agent 1 has been located. The left side of
the inequality is agent 2’s support utility by choosing x′3. The right side of
the inequality is agent 2’s support utility by choosing x1. That means agent 2
gets more support utility by choosing x′3 than choosing x1, contradicting to the
assumption. Hence agent 3 has no incentive to deviate.
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In Case 4, we have u2 = u3 by Lemma 1. There are 3 possibilities about
who the winners are.
Case 4.1:Winner set is {2, 3}. Agent 2 and 3 have no incentive to deviate by
Lemma 1. We next prove agent 1 has no incentive to deviate. If R2 ∩ R1 = ∅,
agent 3 cannot have more support utility than agent 1. So we have R2∩R1 6= ∅
and R1 ∩R3 6= ∅. We consider whether R2 ∩R3 is empty.
Case 4.1.1: R2 ∩ R3 6= ∅. Suppose agent 1 benefits by deviating to x′1. Let
Figure 3: example
R′1 denote the new attraction interval. If R
′
1 ∩R3 = ∅, then we have
u′1 =
∫
R′1−R2
f(x) dx+
∫
R′1∩R2
f(x)
2
dx
≤
∫
R′1−R1
f(x) dx+
∫
R′1∩R1
f(x)
2
dx
≤
∫
R3∩R1
f(x)
2
dx+
∫
R3−R1
f(x) dx
<
∫
R3∩R2
f(x)
2
dx+
∫
R3−R2
f(x) dx
This is the agent 3’s support utility after agent 1’s deviation. Agent 1 cannot
become a winner.
If R′1 ∩R3 6= ∅ and R′1 ∩ (R3 −R2) = ∅, then we have
u′1 =
∫
R′1−R2
f(x) dx+
∫
R2−R3
f(x)
2
dx+
∫
R′1∩R3
f(x)
3
dx
≤
∫
R2−R3
f(x)
2
dx+
∫
R′1−R3
f(x)
3
dx+
∫
R2−R′1
f(x)
2
dx
<
∫
R2−R1
f(x) dx+
∫
R1−R3
f(x)
2
dx+
∫
R′1−R3
f(x)
3
dx+
∫
R2−R′1
f(x)
2
dx
=
∫
R3−R1
f(x) dx+
∫
R1−R2
f(x)
2
dx+
∫
R′1−R3
f(x)
3
dx+
∫
R2−R′1
f(x)
2
dx
This is the agent 3’s support utility after agent 1’s deviation.
If R′1 ∩ (R3 − R2) 6= ∅. Since agent 1 has at least the same support utility
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as agent 2, we have ∫
R′1−R2
f(x)
2
dx ≥
∫
R2−R′1
f(x) dx,
contradicting to the definition of agent 2’s location. To sum up, agent 1 cannot
become a winner by deviating in Case 4.1.1.
Case 4.1.2: R2 ∩R3 = ∅. The proof is similar to the that in Case 4.1.1 and
thus omitted.
Case 4.2:Winner set is {1}. Then agent 1 has no incentive to move. By
definition of agent 2’s location, we have∫
R2−R1
f(x) dx+
∫
R1∩R2
f(x)
2
dx >
∫
R1
f(x)
2
dx∫
R2−R1
f(x) dx >
∫
R1−R2
f(x)
2
dx
We claim that R1 ∩R2 ∩R3 = ∅, otherwise we have
u2 =
∫
R2−R1
f(x) dx+
∫
R2−(R1∩R3)
f(x)
2
dx+
∫
R2∩R1∩R3
f(x)
3
dx
>
∫
R1−R2
f(x)
2
dx+
∫
R2−(R1∩R3)
f(x)
2
dx+
∫
R2∩R1∩R3
f(x)
3
dx
= u1
Suppose agent 2 deviates to x′2. If x
′
2 < x2, u2 weakly decreases and R1 ∩ R2
weakly shrinks. Furthermore, u1 weakly increases. Agent 2 would not be the
winner. If x′2 ∈ (x2, x3), by the definition of x2 and x3, agent 2 has less support
utility than agent 3 no matter whether R2∩R3 is empty. If x′2 ∈ [x3, 1), R′2∩R3.
By Lemma 1, u′2 is at most equal to agent 3’s support utility. Now we prove
agent 1 has strictly higher support utility than agent 3 after agent 2’s deviation.
Agent 1’s support utility is∫
R1−R3
f(x) dx+
∫
R3−R′2
f(x) dx+
∫
R1∩R3∩R′2
f(x)
3
dx
>
∫
R3−R1
f(x) dx+
∫
R3−R′2
f(x)
2
dx+
∫
R1∩R3∩R′2
f(x)
3
dx
>
∫
R3−R1
f(x)
2
dx+
∫
R3−R′2
f(x)
2
dx+
∫
R1∩R3∩R′2
f(x)
3
dx
This is the agent 3’s support utility. To sum up, agent 2 would not deviate,
neither does agent 3.
Case 4.3: winner set is {1, 2, 3}. The proof of agent 1 would not deviate
is similar to that in Case 4.1. The proof of agent 2 or 3 would not deviate is
similar to that in Case 4.2.
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Case 5: first we claim winner set can not be {2, 3}. By definition, we have
R3 ∩R1 ⊂ R3 ∩R2. We consider u1, u2 when there are only agent 1 and 2, then
we take count into the impact of agent 3.
u1 =
∫
R1−R2
f(x) dx+
∫
R1∩R2
f(x)
2
dx
+
∫
R1∩R2∩R3
(
f(x)
3
− f(x)
2
)
dx (2)
u2 =
∫
R2−R1
f(x) dx+
∫
R1∩R2
f(x)
2
dx
+
∫
R1∩R2∩R3
(
f(x)
3
− f(x)
2
)
dx
+
∫
(R2∩R3)−R1
(
f(x)
2
− f(x)
)
dx (3)
We have u1 ≥ u2. Thus if agent 2 is a winner, agent 1 is a winner too.
Case 5.1: winner set is {1}. In this sub-case, the argument is independent
with the leftmost property of x1. Then w.l.o.g. we assume x1 < x2 ≤ x3. Agent
1 has no incentive to deviate. Suppose agent 2 deviate to x′2. If x
′
2 ∈ [0, x2) ∪
(x3, 1], agent 3 has strictly more support utility than agent 2. If x
′
2 ∈ (x2, x3],
agent 1’s support utility weakly increase, agent 2’s support utility is weakly
smaller than agent 3’s. Agent 3’s support utility weakly decreases. Then agent
1 has strictly more support utility than agent 2. Thus agent 2 would not deviate.
Suppose agent 3 deviates to x′3. If x
′
3 ∈ [0, x2)∪ (x3, 1], then agent 2 has strictly
more support utility than agent 3. If x′3 ∈ [x2, x3), agent 3 has weakly less
support utility than agent 2. But the support utility difference between agent
2 and agent 1 becomes larger. Thus agent 3 would not deviate.
Case 5.2: winner set is {1, 2, 3}. The proof that agent 2 and 3 have no
incentive to deviate is same as in Case 5.1. Since u1 = u2 and by Equation (2)
and (3), we have R2 ∩R3 = ∅. Since u1 = u2, x2 is also a best choice for agent
1 at the beginning. By the leftmost property of x1, we know x1 < x2. Suppose
agent 1 deviates to x′1. If x
′
1 ∈ [0, x1)∪ (x1, x2), agent 1 has strictly less support
utility than agent 2. If x′1 ∈ [x2, 1) and R′1 ∩ R3 = ∅, agent 1 has strictly less
support utility than agent 3.
u′1 =
∫
R′1−R2
f(x) dx+
∫
R′1∩R2
f(x)
2
dx
<
∫
R′1−R1
f(x) dx+
∫
R′1∩R1
f(x)
2
dx
≤u3
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If x′1 ∈ [x2, 1) and R′1 ∩R3 6= ∅,
u′1 =
∫
R′1−R2−R3
f(x) dx+
∫
R′1∩(R2∪R3)
f(x)
2
dx
<
∫
R′1−R2
f(x) dx+
∫
R′1∩R2
f(x)
2
dx
This is agent 2’s support utility after deviation. Agent 1 has strictly less support
utility than agent 2. Hence in case 5.2, no agent would deviate.
When w = 0.5, the attraction intervals overlap in general. We make use of
this property and give Algorithm 2 to construct a Nash equilibrium with width
0.5.
• Let u1 denote the largest support utility that agent 1 could achieve, i.e.
u1 = max{
∫
[x−w/2,x+w/2] f(y) dy}.
• If we can allocate 2 agents at the same time such that everyone achieves
the support utility u1, i.e.∫
[0,0.5]
f(x) dx =
∫
[0,0.5]
f(x) dx = u1.
When there are k agents, we allocate dk/2e agents at 0.25 and k − dk/2e
agents at 0.75.
• If we can allocate only one agent that achieves the support utility u1, then
we allocate the first agent at x1. Define t such that everyone in the first
t agents maximizes the support utility at x1 given the previous agents’
locations, but this no longer holds for the (t+ 1)-th agent.
– When there are k ≤ t+ 1 agent, we allocate them together at x1.
– When there are k ≥ t+ 2 agent, let ~x = (x, ..., x) (the number of x is
k − 2). We define left largest support utility ll(x) and right largest
support utility rl(x):
ll(x) = max
{∫ z+0.25
z−0.25
f(y)
c(y, ~x)
dy
∣∣∣∣ z ≤ x}
rl(x) = max
{∫ z+0.25
z−0.25
f(y)
c(y, ~x)
dy
∣∣∣∣ z ≥ x}
Here c(y, ~x) = k− 2 if |y− x| ≤ w/2 and c(y, ~x) = 0 if |y− x| > w/2.
There exists x∗ such that ll(x∗) = rl(x∗). Let xl ≤ x be a solution
of z for
∫ z+0.25
z−0.25
f(y)
c(y) dy = ll(x
∗) and xr ≥ x be a solution of z for∫ z+0.25
z−0.25
f(y)
c(y) dy = rl(x
∗). We put the first k−2 agents at x∗, (k−1)-th
agent at xl, k-th agent at xr.
15
In the second case and when there are more than k ≥ t+ 2 agents, based on
the width is 0.5 the union of the support of (k− 1)-th agent and k-th agent will
cover the support of previous agents. In fact, the (k− 1)-th and k-th agents are
the unique two winners.
Theorem 5. When w = 0.5, Algorithm 2 gives a Nash equilibrium.
The main proof is omitted due to the space. We only prove that Algorithm 2
could find a location profile, i.e., there exists x∗ such that ll(x∗) = rl(x∗) when
there are k ≥ t+ 2 agents in the second case.
Proof. When the first k− 2 agents located at x1, suppose the support utility of
the (k− 1)th agent is maximized at x2. In fact, we can prove x2 6= x1. W.l.o.g,
we assume x2 > x1, then rl(x1) ≥ ll(x1). Moreover
rl(0.75) =
∫ 1
0.5
f(y)
k − 1 dy ≤
∫ x1+0.25
x1−0.25
f(y)
k − 1 dy ≤ ll(0.75)
Since ll(x) is continuous and weakly increasing while rl(x) is continuous and
weakly decreasing, x∗ exists.
For smaller width, the attraction interval may not overlap. This results
new possibilities of the interval intersection relationship, and many possibilities
about who is the winner. Hence the proof does not hold for smaller width.
Lemma 2. If there always exists a Nash equilibrium when w = 0.5, then it also
holds for w ≥ 0.5.
In this case, the interval (1−w,w) belongs to every agent’s support. The idea
is we can remove this interval and the problem becomes proving the existence
of Nash equilibrium with w = 0.5.
Proof. When w > 0.5, we can construct a Nash equilibrium from an instance
with w = 0.5. We let the new distribution function be
g(x) =

f((2− 2w)x)∫ 1−w
0
f(y) dy +
∫ 1
w
f(y) dy
x ≤ 0.5
f((2− 2w)x+ 2w − 1)∫ 1−w
0
f(y) dy +
∫ 1
w
f(y) dy
x > 0.5
Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium (x1, x2, ..., xn) under distribution g with
width 0.5. We can verify that ((2−2w)x1 +w−0.5, (2−2w)x2 +w−0.5, ...(2−
2w)xn+w−0.5) forms a Nash equilibrium in the distribution f and with width
w.
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5 Fairness in the Nash equilibrium
Definition 4 (Fairness). Given a game G, define the fairness of the game to
be:
FAIR = min
~x∈NE(G)
mini ui(~x)
maxi ui(~x)
Intuitively, given a location profile ~x, the ratio mini ui(~x)maxi ui(~x) describes how fairly
the utilities are divided among all agents. We choose the lowest such ratio of
Nash equilibria as our fairness criterion.
In the winner utility setting, The fairness is simply 0 if there exists a losing
agent, or 1 otherwise. In the support utility setting, the fairness is generally
not easy to compute. However, we give a tight lower bound in such a setting.
We first give a lemma that bounds the ratio mini ui(~x)maxi ui(~x) for any Nash equilib-
rium.
Lemma 3. The utility of agent i is at least 12dwj/wie fraction of the utility of
agent j. The bound is tight.
Proof. In support utility maximization setting, we have
ui ≥
∫ s+wi
s
f(x)
c(x, ~x−i) + 1
dx ≥ 1
2
∫ s+wi
s
f(x)
c(x, ~x−i)
dx, ∀s.
The idea is to split the interval (xj−wj/2, xj +wj/2) into many small intervals
with size wj , and apply the inequality on them:
⌈
wj
wi
⌉
ui ≥ 1
2
⌈
wj
wi
⌉∑
k=1
∫ xi−wi2 +wj ·(k−1)
xi−wi2 +wj ·(k−1)
f(x)
c(x, ~x−i)
dx
≥ 1
2
∫ xi−wj2 +⌈wjwi ⌉·wi
xi−wj2
f(x)
c(x, ~x−i)
dx
≥ uj
2
Consider the case distribution
f(x) =
{
2/3 x ≤ 1/2
4/3 1/2 < x
There are two agents with the same width 1/2, (x1 = 0.25, x2 = 0.75) is a Nash
equilibrium. We can see the ratio of support utility between two agent meets
the bound 1/2.
Suppose agent 1 has the largest support utility, agent n has the smallest
support utility, we can easily get the ratio between the largest and smallest
support utility is 12dw1/wne .
The following theorem is immediate based on Lemma 3.
Theorem 6. The fairness in the support utility setting is at least 12dwM/wme ,
where wM = max{w} and wm = min{w}. The bound is tight.
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6 Price of anarchy and upper
bound of uncovered support
The price of anarchy is an important metric that measures how efficiency de-
crease due to agents’ selfish behaviors. In particular, we define the price of
anarchy as follows:
Definition 5 (Price of anarchy). Given a game G, the price of anarchy of the
game is
PoA =
min~x∈NE(G)
∑n
i=1 ui(~x)
max~x
∑n
i=1 ui(~x)
If we consider PoA in the winner utility maximization setting, the sum of the
utility is always 1. There is no inefficiency. If we consider amount of uncovered
support in the winner utility maximization setting, the upper bound could reach
1, which has a poor performance. To make the problem interesting, we mainly
consider the support utility maximization setting.
First, consider the price of anarchy.
Theorem 7. The price of anarchy of the support utility maximization is at least
1
2 . The bound is tight.
Proof. Suppose the optimal location profile that maximizes the sum of support
utilities is ~x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, ..., x
∗
n), and the Nash equilibrium location profile is
(x1, x2, ..., xn). The sum of support utilities in ~x
∗ is upper bounded by adding
n agents with location ~x,
n∑
i=1
ui(~x
∗) ≤
2n∑
k=1
uk(~x
∗, ~x)
<
n∑
k=1
uk(x
∗
i , ~x−i) +
n∑
k=1
uk(xi, ~x−i)
≤
n∑
k=1
uk(xi, ~x−i) +
n∑
k=1
uk(xi, ~x−i)
=2
n∑
k=1
uk(~x)
Thus, PoA ≥ 1/2.
Actually, when n goes to infinity, the poa can be arbitrarily close to 1/2.
Consider the example, there are n agents with the same width 1/n.
f(x) =
{
n2
2n−1 x ∈ [0, 1/n]
n
2n−1 x ∈ (1/n, 1]
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The optimal location profile is ( 12n ,
3
2n , ...,
2n−1
2n ), i.e., the union of the support
covers [0, 1] interval. The optimal support utility is 1. While, consider the Nash
equilibrium ( 12n ,
1
2n , ...,
1
2n ), i.e., all the agents are located at point
1
2n . The
support utility in this Nash equilibrium is n2n−1 . When n goes to infinity, the
PoA converges to 1/2.
Then we can consider how many clients are not served.
Theorem 8. The support of the uncovered clients is at most 11+
∑
i wi
Proof. We let p denote the “uncovered support”, q denote “covered support”.
Suppose u1w1 = min{ uiwi }, i.e., agent 1 has the lowest density of the support
utility. Then the sum of all agents’ support utility is at least
q ≥
∑
i
wi · u1
w1
We split the interval [0, 1] into pieces with size w1.If we don’t count agent 1, then
in each small pieces, the support of the uncovered set is at most u1. Otherwise,
agent 1 will deviate to cover this interval. Then the sum of the uncovered
support is at most d 1w1 e · u1 Since agent 1 has covered u1, then actually the
uncovered support can be limited,
p ≤ (
⌈
1
w1
⌉
− 1) · u1 ≤ u1
w1
At last we have
p =
p
p+ q
=
1
1 + q/p
≤ 1
1 + (
∑
i wi · u1w1 )/( u1w1 )
=
1
1 +
∑
i wi
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